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      UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
      SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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     MARSH & MCLENNAN AGENCY LLC,
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                     Plaintiff,
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                                              19 Civ. 3837 (VSB)
                 V.
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      RICK FERGUSON,
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                     Defendant.
8
                                               New York, N.Y.
9
                                                May 2, 2019
                                                9:00 a.m.
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      Before:
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                         HON. VERNON S. BRODERICK,
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                                                District Judge
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                                APPEARANCES
14
      LITTLER MENDELSON. P.C.
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          Attorneys for Plaintiff
      BY: A. MICHAEL WEBER
          DANIELLA ADLER
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      OUTTEN & GOLDEN LLP
          Attorneys for Defendant
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      BY: NICHOLAS H. SIKON
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1	(Case called)
2	THE COURT: Counsel, please note their appearances for
3	the record.
4	We're here on Marsh McLennan v. Ferguson
5	MR. WEBER: Michael Weber and Daniella Adler, Littler
6	Mendelson, for the plaintiff.
7	MR. SIKON: Good morning. Nicholas Sikon for the
8	defendant, Rick Ferguson.
9	THE COURT: Mr. Sikon, I don't know, have you had an
10	opportunity to file an appearance?
11	MR. SIKON: I was retained last night at around 8:00
12	in the evening, so I haven't had a chance to do that.
13	THE COURT: I figured as much. I looked at the docket
14	after that to see whether anybody filed a notice of appearance.
15	I take it you've been in contact with the attorney who
16	is mentioned in the who Ms. Dupri, Mr. Dupri?
17	MR. SIKON: Yes, your Honor. I spoke briefly with
18	Ms. Dupri and Mr. Ferguson last night.
19	THE COURT: All right. You may be seated.
20	I have all the papers. Have the parties had an
21	opportunity to discuss where things stand and what the next
22	step is?
23	Let me hear from plaintiff and then I'll hear from
21	defendant

MR. WEBER: Thank you, your Honor.

I just met Mr. Sikon this morning. I'm sure we'll have an opportunity to work together and organize a discovery schedule.

As you know, we're here on an application for a TRO and expedited discovery.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. WEBER: The facts as we have them before your

Honor are quite stark. We have an individual who worked for

our client for a long time, signed not one by two agreements.

This is not a non-compete case. He can work wherever he wants.

He can't solicit our clients. He did it both before he

resigned and after.

There is a number of declarations and affidavits before your Honor with exhibits that show that he has clearly violated his obligations. We are seeking this extraordinary relief because he has blatantly violated those obligations. We also ask for expedited discovery. We are prepared to take depositions within the next week and to move this case along.

Again, I have not had an opportunity --

THE COURT: Sure. Well, let me see.

Mr. Sikon, am I pronouncing that correctly?

MR. SIKON: Yes, you are, your Honor.

THE COURT: Are you sure?

MR. SIKON: Yes.

THE COURT: All right. Now, Mr. Sikon, I guess the

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question I have is, well, what is your position? 1 2 In other words, what is your position? 3 MR. SIKON: Your Honor, a few things. First of all, I am obviously still getting up to speed 4 5 on the matter. 6 THE COURT: Yes. 7 A few things I wanted to note to your MR. SIKON: 8 Honor this morning. 9 First, I think it is fairly evident from their own 10 submission there is no real emergency here and there is no need 11 for a TRO. It is clear from --12 THE COURT: Would you agree, will your client agree he 13 will stop contacting clients that he used to service at Marsh 14 McLennan? 15 MR. SIKON: I actually think that goes to a second If you look at the actual language of the agreements at 16 17 issue, I don't actually think he is barred from soliciting 18 those clients. He is barred from using confidential information or trade secrets to solicit clients. He is not 19 20 actually barred from soliciting those clients. 21 As another issue, your Honor, I think they are 22 asking --23 THE COURT: While he was at Marsh McLennan? 24 In other words, while he was at Marsh McLennan, do you

think he would be allowed to start saying, Oh, by the way, I'm

going to be leaving, going somewhere else, it is not a problem, and my current employer actually agrees with it, which is what some of the e-mails apparently indicate?

I mean, I don't know. I guess what I'm trying to say is --

Well, I'm sorry, go ahead. I cut you off.

MR. SIKON: Your Honor, to your point, I believe that he was well within his rights under both California and New York law, and I also think there is another issue as to whether or not California law is ultimately going to be the applicable law with respect to a number of these issues.

But I do think that he would be well within his rights to say, I am resigning here and I am going to a new employer and you are free to come with me if you so choose. He is not allowed to use confidential or trade secret information under California law to do so, but if it is publicly available information, absolutely.

Now, your Honor, there is a couple other things I also wanted to raise to your attention, which is notably absent from any of the briefing here, is the fact that Mr. Ferguson is a registered professional, and Marsh McLennan Agency is the parent company of his employer, which is Marsh McLennan Securities, LLC, which is a registered entity under FINRA.

So we think there is a very strong likelihood, your Honor, we are probably going to file a motion to compel

arbitration that these issues should all be before FINRA, as opposed to in your court.

Other issues that I wanted to raise to your attention, your Honor, are in particular the fact that, again, they've been in communication with Mr. Ferguson's California counsel since February of this year, so two and a half months ago. So I don't really understand the rush to the courthouse now on two days' notice to ask for an emergency temporary restraining order when clearly they've been aware of these issues for two and a half months. To me, that strikes me as bad faith, and that they took their time to basically coddle together this 170-page brief, rush to the courthouse door to get it filed, when they clearly have been on notice of these issues for as long as two and a half months now.

Additionally, as I noted, I'm not licensed in California, but I understand from some of my colleagues in California that California has a very strong policy perspective that when you have agreements like this that try to basically -- you have an individual who is employed in San Francisco, in California, you have supervisors who are in California, and you have, as far as I can tell from my quick read of the motion papers here, all the salient factual issues are rising out of California.

My understanding is that California is going to take a very different view of plaintiff trying to use a forum

selection provision and choice of law provision to circumvent and basically afford Mr. Ferguson less protections than what he would be entitled to under California law with respect to these issues.

That is another threshold issue, along with the others that I've already mentioned, that I think is going to need to be decided here before we can proceed with any TRO or any expedited discovery.

THE COURT: Well, I mean, the issue before me -because I think there is substantial proof that there was
solicitation going on before he even left. I don't know
whether what sort of fiduciary obligations he had at the time
that he was at his former employer, and while I think, yes,
there are issues about choice of law, right, there are two
issues, right?

If the venue provision, in other words, choosing

New York is correct, do you apply California law or does the

whole thing go to arbitration or does the whole thing -- again,

I don't -- in my mind, the least likely, is it something that

should be litigated in California.

But in any event, you're right, those are all issues that need to be dealt with. However, my reading of the correspondence and the letter from Mr. Ferguson's lawyer was that she did not directly engage the issue, or at least it seemed to me engage the issue of the agreements, instead,

what she raised was the possibility of filing some form of discrimination suit.

So while I think, yes, you're right, there has been a time lag, it seemed like there was a little bit -- it could be interpreted that -- well, not even interpreted -- it could be interpreted as a little bit of delay to actually get to the issues which the plaintiff was raising.

There may be counterclaims. There may be a separate lawsuit related to that or somehow they are tied, and I don't know if the claim is that it is retaliatory, but they didn't engage on the specific issue of the confidential information, at least it didn't seem to me at least in the exchange, at least that initial letter that was written, that that was addressed.

I agree there has been a lag, somewhat of a delay, but are you saying that your client isn't willing at this stage to meet and confer with the other side about what the parameters will be going forward to maintain whether you go to arbitration or whether you're going to be here and whatever law applies to sort of maintain things where they are now. In other words, so let's say I say, OK, fine, we'll wait for the TRO hearing at some other point in time.

Is your client -- let me ask, is your client going to then continue to contact -- I guess the allegations are there were 20 some odd people -- it may be that in the end of the

day, that the relevant rules of FINRA that he has some ability to do that under specific guidelines that FINRA provides, but I guess my question is, so during that interim period, is your client willing to at least figure out what the parameters are going to be going forward, and also in terms of my understanding there were downloads and e-mails were sent from his former employer's account -- I don't know what the e-mails are -- but over to his new employer.

So I don't know specifically what those are, but when you have things that are transferred like that soon before an employee leaves, that raises question about those materials, including whether or not, while he may have had his own contact list, electronic Rolodex, I don't know exactly whether that is necessarily his.

While you're right, there could be public information, but somehow I think the e-mails, for example, that he was sending from when he was still employed to these customers, I would imagine what happened was he typed into his computer, it populated because he had it in his contact list. Now, if that contact list is not really his property, but Marsh McLennan's, then I think there is an issue.

I guess the threshold issue I'm trying to deal with is getting us from here until the parties could brief whether it is the arbitration issue or the other issues that I'm presented with.

I understand you're saying this is not an emergency, but OK, but is your client willing to basically not continue to call people to have a discussion with regard to the stuff that he not use the stuff that he sent to himself from his -- again, without having gone through the process where people can basically determine some of the stuff is fine, like he was sending, you know, personal e-mail, whatever it was, and that is really what I'm asking?

MR. SIKON: In short, your Honor, yes. Absolutely.

I've already spoken to him, and as I understand it, he has not and he will not be talking to any Marsh McLennan Agency clients going forward. While, of course, this is pending.

Having said that, your Honor, I did want to note that if you look specifically at the language of the agreements at issue, both of them that they attach to their briefing, it is very specifically tailored to say, basically, that he will not use any confidential information and trade secrets to solicit those clients.

Our position is, based off of my brief conversation with him, is that he hasn't. To your Honor's point about him having potentially sent himself client contact information, as I understand it from him, that is all publicly available information related to these clients and their 401(k) plans. There is even a form, as I understand it from him, a form 5500 that is required to be filed --

THE COURT: I'm familiar with 5500s.

MR. SIKON: I wasn't. Apparently it has to be filed with the Department of Labor, and it basically includes information related to the contact information of these particular clients.

As we all know, as a matter --

THE COURT: But let me ask this. There is a difference, though, I think, between something that you can — where he has a memory of, like, this is my client, this is mine, and then he separately goes and gets the information publicly, as opposed to an aggregation that has either been done by him or by the company. It not only includes 5500 information, but it includes other information about that client, including information that — again, this is really in the weeds — information that he was either provided when he got the lead or information that he's developed over time with regard to the client, idiosyncrasies, wife's name, mother's name, you husband's name, kids, all of those things that I don't know. But I imagine it may have been part of all this material that got shipped over.

While I understand that -- I think there is an issue about -- I'm not sure where the law comes out on this. In other words, if you have something that is in your contact list which is publicly available, does that mean that you can just take the contact list if the company basically has some claim

to that because they provided the leads or what have you. I don't know.

I understand the issues. Let me ask this to cut to the chase -- because I'll give the parties a few days to basically come to an agreement as to what is going to be going forward. You're not going to be conceding anything other than saying during the time period that either this case is pending or if the parties agree that it should go to arbitration, that you're in arbitration, whatever it may be, to a document that basically outlines the conduct of what both sides are going to be doing.

You've said that he has no intention to contact any of the Marsh clients or the people who were his clients and however you want to phrase it. I think there is — the other side is that sort of the confidential, allegedly confidential information. It may end up being that there is a determination that some of that is not confidential under the agreements in question, but it may end up that some of it is.

I guess what I would like the parties to do is, over the next few days, or even if you're able to do it in the next day or so, to come up with something — I have a proposed order — but to come up with something along those lines, whatever language you want to use, that would just maintain going forward. If you can't reach an agreement, then I'll make the ultimate decision.

But what I would say is I'm operating under the understanding that your client right now, even though there isn't anything in place based upon what you've said, is that he's not going to be picking up the phone today or tomorrow and e-mailing and the like or any sort of communication with these folks.

That's my proposal for the parties. It is better -because I don't know all the intricacies of what may have been
confidential information as alleged to have been taken as well
as the number of potential clients that may be at issue.

Let me hear from you with regard to that proposal and I'll ask plaintiff's counsel, also.

MR. SIKON: Yes, your Honor. That is perfectly acceptable to us.

The only thing I would just like to know, your Honor, to your point a few minutes ago about the client contacts, my understanding is it was nothing more than contact information. It was literally his Outlook contacts.

I think it is pretty clear under New York law that you are entitled to recreate that from memory and from public sources. So, again, we are, of course, going to work with plaintiff here, and we are happy to see if we can reach a resolution regarding a restriction that is in line with the actual language of the agreement —

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. SIKON: -- while we try to work out these issues.

Again, I just wanted to note that particular issue with respect to that.

THE COURT: I get that. There may be, I recognize — and I apologize, because I know you're just coming into this — but as I said, it's been sort of percolating for a while, and I think there was this strategic choice that counsel in California made. And I think she said it herself, you know, in her letter, I think something along the lines of, I guess Marsh is taking a view that rather than being on the defense, they are going to go on the offensive, and she raised all of the issues. Strategically, that may have been the way to go. The problem is, it didn't engage on the specific issues that Marsh was concerned with.

Let me hear from plaintiff's counsel on this.

MR. WEBER: Your Honor, I respectfully agree with counsel's interpretation of the law. The information on our plaintiff's contact information is ours, is more than I think that someone can remember.

As to the delays, you can see from the correspondence, we did make a good faith effort since we found out about the breaches to try to work out a resolution. We sent correspondence. We got some back. We tried to do it before we got here with respect to the delay.

What I would recommend to your Honor is that you sign

a TRO for a few days. I agree with you, I think that gives us an opportunity to sit down and try to work out, one, a discovery schedule -- we would like to take plaintiff's deposition as soon as possible -- and see if there is some confines of an agreement that we can agree to.

But we are not confident that the plaintiff will abide by its obligations based on what we've seen so far before resignation and after. That is why we're hear to ask for some court relief.

THE COURT: Look, this is what we're going to do.

There are going to be two parts to this. What it amounts to,

because I actually will have to, if you can also arrange to get

me a Word version of the order to show cause.

I would enter something for a short period of time to allow the parties to negotiate their sort of own understanding with regard to any expedited discovery. I'll hold that in abeyance. I think that while I'm not saying that it isn't appropriate, I don't know enough concerning whether or not there is an arbitration issue or not. If there is not, the parties should talk about that initially, because if there — but to be clear, with regard to whether — so I haven't decided that yet.

So what I would like to hear, in the same timeframe that the parties attempt to negotiate something in connection with the restrictions going forward, I would like to get the

parties' at least initial view about this whole -- if there is an issue related to this, whether there is arbitration or litigation.

MR. WEBER: We don't believe it is an issue at all, your Honor.

THE COURT: I understand. I mean, I understand that there is going to be -- again, it is not something I had thought about until it was raised. It may not be an issue. It may be that after you meet and confer, that you agree on that. It is just that I don't want to start the ball rolling on expedited discovery until I get a sense of what and whether or not there is an issue there.

Again, I'm not precluding having expedited discovery.

I'm also not precluding the parties from trying to, in your discussions of this -- look, I don't know where the pressure points necessarily are -- to try to resolve

this. Look, the bottom line is, Marsh has certain information they believe was taken. The defendant may dispute that, but the defendant is at a new place of employment, and I can't imagine this is the best way to start wherever he is starting, in particular. And as I was reading through the papers, I was wondering, you know, whether the new place of employment, where they were in the picture, and whether at some point are they going to be a necessary party or what is going on. I just didn't know.

I guess what I'm saying is, yes, talk about all the issues in the case that you believe are relevant. I understand that there is going to be a disagreement about arbitration. I may need to make a decision on that. I will do that.

But if I could get a Word version of this document, we'll take -- but you should know that with the exception of the discovery issues, and again, that in sort of broad strokes, that I'm orally imposing a restraining order with regard to contacting Mr. Ferguson's Marsh's clients and from utilizing the information that was transferred from either by e-mail, downloads, or otherwise from Marsh.

Recognizing, and I'm not weighing in on whether or not that material ultimately will be found to be confidential. So until I can enter the actual written order, you should let your client know that I orally imposed those restrictions.

Then we'll get the written order either later today -because I have a criminal trial that I'm doing -- either later
today it will hit the docket or the latest at some point
tomorrow, the written order.

 $$\operatorname{MR.}$$ WEBER: We'll have that Word document to you this morning.

THE COURT: Fantastic.

MR. SIKON: Your Honor, if I may, two things with respect to the TRO.

So I mentioned this a little while ago. One, one of

the concerns that I have is that the proposed order that they had submitted, again, it does not actually reflect the language within the agreement in terms of the restriction. Again, the restriction with respect to Mr. Ferguson was that he would not be allowed to use confidential information or trade secrets to solicit MMA clients. There was not actually just a straight bar on solicitation of MMA clients.

I just want to be clear, your Honor, that it is our position that he is, under this agreement, allowed to solicit MMA clients. Just to the extent you're considering an order with respect to that, I just wanted to flag that for your attention.

The other thing, your Honor, if I make one more point?

THE COURT: Go ahead.

MR. SIKON: I believe their proposed order had restrictions on soliciting MMA employees, which I agree there is a restriction in here on him soliciting MMA employees, but so far as I'm aware from my quick review of the papers, there is no allegation that he has actually done that.

So, again, I would just ask your Honor, considering the actual written order, that there be some consideration of those two issues.

THE COURT: Sure. Look, with regard to the language, let me put it this way, obviously the restrictions would be based upon the contract of limitations as the relevant law

applies to them.

However, assuming I take the language out of the contract and utilize it, Mr. Ferguson might be playing with fire to try, in other words, skate in between that, if you understand what I'm saying.

In the sense that I understand that's your position, and it may well prevail, but it may not. Therefore, if he starts doing this -- and that's why, quite frankly -- and while it may be just staking out your legal position and it is not that the client intends to sort of try and continue to do -- because here is an example of a problem with the way that may happen.

There were a lot of things shifted over. At the same time, he still has the information. And yes, he may have some memory of something, he goes and Googles it. There is going to be a question of where that information came from. Because now that — it would be one thing if he didn't take anything and he sat down day one at his new employer and racked his brain about all the people that he had contact with and did the public searches.

Again, I have not, you know, delved deeply into the law. I think right now, because he has taken those things, there would be a question about whether or not and where he actually got -- putting aside, just saying assuming that -- I understand there is an argument that you would make that the

information in his contact list is not confidential within the meaning of the agreement.

So I'll consider what you said as I draft the language of it, but I'll also consider whether or not, in order to maintain the status quo, I understand ultimately it may be, it may end up exactly where you are, but there sounds to be a fair amount of dispute about some of the issues.

I understand what you're saying. I'll take a look at that as I draft the language.

All right. I'm going to put a time period in the actual order. How much time do you think you need — obviously, I know counsel is getting up to speed — but I assume that Ms. Dupri will be involved in those discussions.

How much time do you think you need to work that out? I was thinking at some point next week.

MR. WEBER: I was going to say by end of the day Tuesday, if that works for you.

MR. SIKON: That does, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. End of the day Tuesday. I think that makes sense.

Look, if you need some additional time, just let me know. But I'm thinking, you know, again, barring anything unforeseen, the outside, next week is what I was thinking. Tuesday made sense to me. We'll make it Tuesday. With the understanding that I'm orally imposing the temporary

restraining order. I haven't specifically come up with the language, but I'm orally imposing that along the lines I mentioned earlier. All right. Is there anything else that we need to deal with today? MR. WEBER: I don't believe so, your Honor. MR. SIKON: Nothing, your Honor. THE COURT: Thank you very much for coming in. I'm sorry it had to be so quick. MR. WEBER: Thank you, your Honor. I appreciate it. THE COURT: Yes. (Adjourned)